China Between Iran and Israel: Profit on Thin Ice
China's quiet strategy in the Israel-Iran conflict brings short-term gains - but the price is high. Oil, diplomacy and world power status are being shaken.
China is more of a spectator than an active participant in the Israel-Iran conflict. The conflict is weakening China's global ambitions while it is trying to expand its influence regionally. Trump's intervention in Iran is forcing Beijing to reassess key axioms of its strategy. Energy supply, diplomatic networks and geopolitical maneuvers are coming under pressure.
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China and Iran: four-point plan of empty words
General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday. Xi called for de-escalation and presented a four-point plan. This includes the cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians, the resumption of diplomatic talks and greater cooperation with the UN Security Council. His words sounded moderate. Unlike Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who had previously condemned Israel's attacks as a violation of international law, Xi avoided direct recriminations. Instead, he spoke of a "new phase of turbulence and transformation".
This reticence suggests that China is keeping its options open. However, the initiative has gone largely unnoticed worldwide, just as it has little chance of success. China and Russia are considered close partners of Iran, which undermines their role as neutral mediators. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China's reputation as a diplomatic bridge-builder has suffered. Many had hoped that Beijing could mediate between conflicting parties, but apart from a weak peace proposal, China's influence has remained limited.
China's diplomatic restraint belies a harsh reality. Behind the diplomatic façade, China's dependency on the region is obvious. Over 43 percent of imported oil comes from the Middle East. Iran supplies a significant proportion, often at greatly reduced prices. Around 1.7 million barrels per day flow into Chinese refineries, primarily in Shandong province. An Israeli attack on Iranian oil infrastructure would immediately have a noticeable impact on China's energy supply. Then there is the Malacca problem. Most of the oil reaches China via narrow sea routes that are easily blocked. Despite investments in alternative energies, Beijing remains dependent on Middle East oil.
South China Sea: expansion in the shadow of war
China is profiting from the conflict. The US is shifting its military resources to the Middle East, shrinking its presence in the Indo-Pacific. This gives Beijing more leeway to push ahead with its aggressive expansion in the South China Sea and exert pressure on Taiwan. China is using this weakness to assert its maritime claims and strengthen its military readiness for a possible Taiwan conflict. The global attention on the Middle East is also distracting attention from these conflict hotspots, which allows Beijing to take even tougher action.
At the same time, China is trying to undermine the reputation of the USA, especially in the global South, by branding its support for Israel's war in Gaza as a moral failure. Beijing stylizes itself as a neutral actor that avoids conflicts. State media fuel this impression by denouncing the US as overburdened and hypocritical. Economically, Beijing is securing clear advantages for itself. While the US and the UK are conducting military operations against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, China has achieved free passage for ships through tacit agreements with the Houthis. This saves costs and shows how Beijing exploits the insecurity of others without taking risks itself.
China's relationship with Iran has deepened in recent years. In addition to oil purchases, Beijing exports weapons and dual-use goods to Tehran. Joint military exercises with Russia and Iran, such as the "Maritime Security Belt", underline this partnership.
China covertly delivering weapons to Iran?
Reports that Chinese cargo planes had been en route to Iran therefore came as little surprise. Between June 14 and 16, 2025, three planes disappeared from radar screens near Iran. Flight data and satellite images fueled speculation that Beijing was supplying weapons to fuel the conflict with Israel. The suspicion seemed plausible, given China's close ties to Iran and previous covert support for Russia. But closer scrutiny showed that the planes were following regular trade routes to Europe. The rumors arose from a mixture of Iranian propaganda, social media users who misunderstood flight tracking data, and inaccurate journalism.
China's only active intervention was the evacuation of over 1600 citizens from Iran and several hundred from Israel. Beyond that, Beijing's influence remains limited. The UN Security Council, which Xi wants to involve more closely, remains divided. Direct military or diplomatic interventions are beyond China's reach. Instead, Beijing is relying on indirect advantages. The conflict binds the US, weakens its global leadership role and buys China time to expand its position in Eurasia. In the long term, Beijing is portraying the US as an unreliable player, while positioning itself as a pragmatic alternative.
Beijing's illusion of global strength is crumbling
The Israeli attack on Iran is fundamentally changing China's strategic situation. Beijing is in danger of losing another ally in Iran, or at least of seeing a severely weakened partner. Israel's targeted strikes against the Revolutionary Guards, the secret service and Tehran's police headquarters threaten the regime. A collapse would severely affect China's influence in the Middle East and its access to cheap oil.
At the same time, US support for Israel is shaking a key Chinese assumption: that Trump avoids military confrontations. This misjudgement jeopardizes Beijing's strategy in the South China Sea, where it is using the US distraction to expand its maritime claims. Until now, China has relied on a weakened US presence and divided Western alliances under Trump. However, its unpredictability - for example through possible naval operations or sanctions - is forcing Beijing to recalibrate its plans. China's inflexible leadership, characterized by bureaucratic rigidity, is reaching its limits here. Nevertheless, China is currently seizing its opportunity here and creating new facts.
A similar pattern can be seen in the Taiwan conflict. In the short term, the Middle East conflict diverts attention away from the island, but in the long term this tends to strengthen Taiwan's position. Trump's willingness to expand arms supplies or support provocative moves makes it clear that China does not have a free hand there. Beijing's aggressive maneuvers, such as increased airspace violations, could trigger an unforeseen US response for which China is ill-equipped.
Diplomacy remains China's weak point. Xi's four-point plan, discussed only with Putin, is ineffective and underlines Beijing's isolation. The Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis - an "alliance of losers" with a weakened Russia, weakened Houthis and a threatened Hamas - is crumbling. China styles itself as the mouthpiece of the global South, but its pragmatic policies prevent genuine alliances. China completely lacks the cultural common ground that binds NATO together through a shared heritage of the Anglo-American and European regions. Russia, Iran and North Korea only have interests in common with Beijing, not loyalty. This isolation, coupled with growing antipathy, weakens its role as a world power.
The economic consequences remain manageable. China's hunger for oil has reached its peak. The loss of Iran as a supplier would drive up prices, but not stop supply. Beijing has already reduced its dependence on Russia and is diversifying its oil purchases. Higher costs are a nuisance, not a disaster. Nevertheless, China remains a spectator with sympathies for Iran, but without the willingness to fully engage. Its pragmatism allows flexibility in the oil trade, but it prevents deep ties, which are crucial in a multipolar world. While the West survives crises through cultural and emotional loyalty, China remains on its own.
In the long term, the risks outweigh the benefits. A weakened Iran, a fragile axis and Trump's unpredictability are putting Beijing under pressure. China is creating facts in the South China Sea, but a US reaction is calling these gains into question. The lack of soft power and cultural isolation make China vulnerable in a world where alliances count. Beijing is acting like an opportunistic observer, scoring points in the short term but losing ground strategically.
The war with Iran fits with Trump’s need to project American military strength. The bluster and chest thumping are on full display for the world to see. But the Iran conflict is a lopsided affair. Trump takes on a completely different demeanor when dealing with nations he considers peers like China and Russia. He desperately ingratiates himself when dealing with Putin and Xi not because he admires aurocrats. Trump fears Xi for what he can do to the US economically and militarily. He is not coming to the aid of Taiwan
China doesn’t need the cultural bond that binds NATO because China’s population is already larger than NATO and is homogenous. I’m not sure Taiwan looks at current events and feels emboldened. America has tried to pivot its military presence from the Middle East to Asia since Obama. The attack on Iran is the exact opposite and makes Taiwan more vulnerable than ever. The US and Israel are already running low on munitions. China will never have that problem.